I will here sketch out, using a basic intuitive model, the contours of a theory of the elementary content of animal and human consciousness. This model targets consciousness as it evolved from mammals to primates to Cro-Magnons, and develops accounts of content structure in basic consciousness from simple being-awake to higher and more specifically human notions of self and reflexivity. It postulates a primordial, grounding narrative structure and suggests a gradual complexification through increasing supply from memory and empathie information from other subjects. The complex result offers an architecture of canonical levels of consciousness and self; this tentative stratification spans from constitutive semiotic structures to aesthetic and linguistic forms of 'being conscious'. Five such strata are described; somewhere midway Cro-Magnons are abandoned by other species, primates or mammals, however domesticated or trained.
The dynamics of basic consciousness
In our present experience, that is, in the integrated perception of here-and-now states of affairs in the outside world, offered to our consciousness when awake, we find ourselves inscribed in two distinct forms of spatial organization, namely a frontal angle of opening and orientation spanning from our sensing body and fanning out toward possible objects of sensor}· attention -a spatial schema evidendy based on the scope of vision -and a 'surround' space in which we are situated as a mobile entity in the middle of a stationary place -a spatial schema most likely based on auditive perception. In this sense, the 'presence of presence' is a representation of the following components (allowing the surround to be represented by a square), fig In general, these components are superimposed by a basic format in consciousness, so we will have a paradoxical double formation which is both 'Olympic' ('observing from above') and 'Subjective' ('observing from the position of the body of the subject'). The angle (or vantage) space and the surround space are correlated, so that we can sense our own 'present presence' as a superposition, a dual installation, typically with the angle as a foreground and the surround space as a background, fig. 2 : The surround component does not, of course, just 'contain' stationary and uniform Objects; the individuals and categories of different possible Objects in an elementar) 7 presence representation -let us term it 'animal consciousness' -will most often be detected and perceived as only partly manifested, only 'signified', by their traces: visual, olfactory, auditive. These Objects especially include what we can call Relevant Others: mobile, animated, conscious, subjective beings, engaging in interactive contact and exchange with the Subject of consciousness we are modelling. Relevant Other categories in animal consciousness, in this sense, will typically include: preys (Ol), dangerous 1 The most elementan', semanticaHy empty, meditative or vegetative state of consciousness that in principle precedes this actantial drama is transformed into such a deictic and situational stage by the perceptive identification and 'gestalting' of Objects, especially Others, physically present or semi-present. Object detection makes use of causal schémas interpreting 'things' that move and possibly perceive, and possibly move because they perceive; I assume that such schémas are active in states of being awake and 'focused'. Categorization of objects, others, and situations is therefore direcdv involved in consciousness as focused perception.
Metaphorically speaking, the surrounding space has 'walls' and 'windows'. Instead of making visual contact with a prey, for instance, the Subject most often has to follow traces of Ol that are causally produced indices of a proximal or distal being (e.g. an animal hiding). The subjective attitude of intending is thus technically a matter of attending to such causal signs. The relation from Subject to Object opens a semiotic window in the wall of presence-space. The typical action schema of the relation Subject-Object (S-Ol) would be one of accessing/'taking'/incorporating or otherwise 'holding'. A possible generalization may consist in associating this schema with a Subject's interpretation of percepts via attractive indexicality as such, or rather, indexicality plus 'desire': an object relation program for detecting, accessing, and 'getting hold oP ('taking' and 'having") .
The relation that the Subject has to establish with an antagonistic 02 may be characterized as iconic, in that the emergence of the antagonistic Other in S's space prompts for two inverted images of the Subject's desire: a serial image of (S-Ol) (= "I want to eat this one"), in which S maps onto 02, and Ol now maps onto S (yielding the chiasmus S:01 :: 02:S = "I want to eat this one, but [::] an antagonist-predator wants to eat W), and a parallel image in which S maps onto 02 and Ol onto itself (S:01 :: 02:01 = "I want to eat this one, but so does my competitor"). The presumingly aggressive attitude of 02 toward S may therefore iconically -that is, perceived in the scope of an intentional exchange of the same schema variably invested, oriented serially (02 -> S -> Ol) or in parallel (02 -> Ol <-S) -signify the 'same' desire. In this dimension, such object relations are thus again semiotic, albeit by force of a different semiotic mechanism, here what we could call antagonistic iconicity. 2 The ambiguous orientation of the iconic mapping is an essential aspect of the triangular drama S-Ol-02. The Subject may mimic 02's attitude, for example by staging a mock attack to scare 02 away; or else, S may mimic Ol's attitude by pretending to flee. 3 We may presuppose yet another semiotic drama as a standard condition, when it happens that an ally, 03, that is, a being recognized as conspecific, meets and greets the Subject. 03 engages in an interaction with S and conceptualizes the situation in which S is found. Likewise but inversely, S conceptualizes some ways in which 03 will interpret S's situation. The interaction between S and 03 typically includes the behavior we call 'politeness'. S will gesturally (by yielding) signify to 03: "Please have a bite of Ol, I can wait": "Your turn first". Or S will (by calling) produce a political invitation: "Please help me fight 02". A conditional coupling of these initiatives will be straightforward: "IF you help me fight 02, THEN you can have a bite of Ol". A conditional idea like this one, combining 'helping' and 'sharing', creates a relation of complicity. It binds the first and the second person in an exchange: "If you X, then I Y", where X is a change in S's situation and Y a change in 03's situation. We are encountering here a basic intentional phenomenon, namely shared intentionality (I want X, you are supposed to want Y). Interrogative gestures ("Do you want YP") followed by an affirmative or negative response are the elementary modes of this type of interaction. If X, then Y: give me X, I will give you Y; X is the code that opens Y to you. X/Y, signifier over signified, is a symbolic, conventional sign. Polite-political and negotiation-oriented behavior and gesturing are thus primordial expressions of symbolicity in the intersubjective framework of basic consciousness.
The above analysis gives us a dynamic-schematic picture of basic consaousness as semiosis, even in classical terms: indexical, iconic, and symbolic. There are many possible implications and consequences of this view; we will briefly develop a series of effects, highlighting those that seem to be the most immediate and immediately important.
The dimensions of memory in experience
Perception has to be periodical, rhythmical. It cannot constantly process the same sensory flow but has to rhythmically scan and 'update' previously processed percepts, both in terms of surrounding space changes and Objectrelated states of affairs. Even if the rhythm is as fast as, or faster than, a sequence of E. Pöppel's basic temporal 'windows' of fully conscious presence (Pöppel 1997) , approximately 3 seconds long, it has to connect percepts already processed and new percepts that 'update' the former, and in this sense, it has to constitute both a remembering and a "remembered present" (Edelman 1989) . How would this view of perception as a process of immediate, spontaneous, automatic revision 4 of our 'memories of here-and-now', so to speak, translate into functions of consciousness as semiosis?
Categorization of Objects and Others -such as a prey or an otherwise attractive entity (Ol) that the Subject intends to 'take'; or of the danger (02) it seeks to avoid or eliminate; or of the ally it wishes to negotiate with -is a form of recognition: seeing something as a specified individual allows the Subject to retrieve it under a distinct, specifying category, recalled as attached to a location toward which the Subject should then orient attention and response. Object constancy, a fundamental property of perception, is of course not a gift of the 'given', but has to be mentally achieved as re-cognition of some cognized entity under a constant (and spatially localized) category: sameness of an individual as 'belonging to' a category remembered to appear at some location in the Subject's surround space. 5 Categories are, in this view, localizers; they help the mind retrieve individual Objects and understand them as 'same' during the process of perception and, subsequendy, from one scene of perception to another. Human beings later superimpose language-based naming on categorization, and eventually manage to share categorical paradigms, which leads to an expansion of the mental capacity of identifying and holding knowledge of individuals in experience. However, when categorical knowledge is nominalized and held as purely 'semantic', it loses its inherent spatial meaning; spatiality must then be added syntactically to the despatialized category, whether generic or deictically identified ("the cat on the maf*).
If the Subject's interaction with Ol is maintained over longer time intervals than those allowing automatic categorical recall, the Subject will appeal to experiences of scenes involving {Ol}, i.e. objects of Ol's category, experiences dealing with "this kind of things". 6 The episodic recollections coming to mind will typically be supplemented by notions of formerly experienced {Ol} properties -semantic attributes, we would call them -and by proprioceptive traces, bodily markers, of the Subject's own actual reactions to {Ol} -procedural recall/ The result is optimally but not necessarily a combined episodic (that is: localized, procedural, and semantic) attitude of the Subject: a certain locally oriented bodily disposition and a corresponding mental (conceptual) orientation. In the Ol window, Ol is now a sign (token) of this semanticoprocedural meaning of {Ol} (as its type). 02 may be categorized and subcategorized as well; here, recall includes the experience of the animated Object's own view of the Subject, in so far as it is accessible to the Subject: in the case of human beings, a view of the situation as seen from this Other, and empathically 'theorized' by the Subject. 8 We remember what we believe that Others -and especially antagonistic Othersexperience when they encounter ourselves in a situation of intending. {02}, let us say, the category of a given sort of opponents, will be able to perceive and 'objectify' both S and Ol, and the relation S-Ol, as parts of a dramatic situation. At least in principle, the Subject will register this external view of the situation and be able to integrate it in the memorized narrative (thus including an external 'narrator': the opponent) of the constellation S-01-02. The Subject, human or animal, has to cognize the fact of being seen (being perceived by the Other) in order to grasp and evaluate the danger of a situation. This rudimentary reflexivity, self-awareness, acquired through the iconic interaction S-02, is of course essential to human narratives in which the dimension called veridiction 9 is important, namely when truth and falsehood are explicidy on the dramatic agenda.
Seeing oneself through Others seeing oneself, and remembering this alloscopic vision, is essential to consciousness on higher levels. The interaction with 03 is particularly significant in this respect. This Other is invited to decide if and to what extent S is in danger; if so, all things being equal, it will itself be implied in the scenario as a 'helper', or in narratological terms, an 'adjuvant' 7 Tulving (1984) suggested the distinction between three memory systems in long-term memory: episodic, semantic, and procedural. This list has become a standard reference in memory literature. 8
Mammals, and especially primates, that distinguish mechanically physical and intentional, voluntary movements, i.e., movements caused bv Others and movements caused by inanimate Objects, do attribute at least a rudiment of mind to such causing Others. In inter-animal mind-reading, in this sense, basic action plans (simple 'narrative schémas") are of importance to survival. 9
French: la véridiclion (Greimas 1979) , the semantic variations occurring in the combinations of being (être) and appearing (paraître), such as simulation and dissimulation.
actant. 10 For the Subject to enter in contact with the 'helper' is to imagine itself being the helper (of someone like the Subject). If the Subject's signal towards 03 means "help me!", and if the interaction is human, it iconically also means "... as I would of course help you, if you were in my shoes". 11 This reversibility is, I suggest to think, primordiali)' built into the empathie and theoretical mental contact competence of the Subject. The call for help involves a commitment. It entails an implicit promise. Calling for help means asking the Other for a gratuitous act of giving} 2 In the notion of 'generosity', giving and helping merge into a normative phenomenon: doing 'good' to Others by acting on a situation in such a way that these Others are truly less in danger (of dying, in prototypical cases) after the act than before. Calling for help is inviting for giving. Giving binds the giver and the receiver to each other, creating lasting representations of 'owing' in the receiver (cf. the phenomenon of 'gratitude"), and 'status' in the giver. Not giving is, correspondingly, being 'bad' or even 'evil'; the person who refuses to give, refuses to establish 'bonds'. Politeness can be understood as behavior that signifies a disposition to be 'good' and accept the 'goodness' of Others. In this communication, the self of the Subject thus acquires yet another aspect: an ethical dimension.
To summarize, so far: the situational Subject is first narrativi^ed (by 02) and then ethically normatimvçd (by 03). The distinctive feature of the ethical self, resulting from recognizing one's situation from 03's position, is that a Subject is seen as being in danger, in a 'critical' situation, and that this crisis is a reason for acting generously, politely, 'responsibly'.
The Subject can mentally leave its initial position and identify with its Others, 02 or 03. It will then be able to recall situations in the past where it was de facto an 02 (opponent) or an 03 (adjuvant) of Other Subjects. The Subject will in particular have to remember what it 'owes' to Others, the help they may need in the future. Here is a major source of representational and therefore temporal consciousness, as thinking beyond the present. Human 'online' perception itself is colored by representational imagination, that is, by 'offline' versions of intersubjective spaces introduced iconically, through 02, or symbolically, through 03, in that we partly escape, so to speak, into past, future, or atemporal spaces, through their windows in our presence space. Similarity (iconicity) and contiguity (here: temporal linking of acts, symbolic doings, signs exchanged) are, as Roman Jakobson suggested, semiotically basic connectors. They are, I wish to add, windows through which our consciousness can reach more reality than meets the eyes and ears of present experience. Such reality is offered by -and therefore dependent on -the Subject's memory, which adds depth and resonance to the present contents, by virtue of these vital actantial connections. We think through Objects and Others. Therefore we think through signs.
The semiotic dimensions of consciousness are responsible for its basic determinations: a narrative self, born in conflicts; an ethical self, born as binding to Others. These basically spatio-temporal dimensions characterize what we apperceive as a constitutive feature of a Subject's 'inner life', namely feeling. To feel 'responsible' is to 'feel', tout court, in the sense of more or less knowingly having 'feelings', or affects, including emotions, moods, and passions. 13 In our view, to acquire a certain capacity to 'decode' Others' feelings in the present is to begin, as an infant, to have the extra-present 'inner life', characteristic of higher 'selves'. 14
Singularity, metonymy, and art
We now have to leave the ground shared by higher animal and basic human consciousness, and study some aspects of human 'higher cognition'. Human Subjects equipped with an 'inner life' develop the concept of a critical condition of self and Other as a matter of personal being, or 'personhood': we attend to the singularity of the vulnerable Other; the singular, particular, individual Oneness of existentialists have referred to as 'creating your self, and the Sartrian principle according to which 'existence precedes essence' (Sartre 1946) . But metonymy can flow backwards from the referent to its signs, so that these inherit the value or force attributed to their source; this is probably what is happening in aesthetics. 18 Our appreciation of the formal 'beauty' of artistic expressions is determined by inverse metonymy, letting the signs and the referent enter a loop of inter-reference between 'form' and 'meaning' (the latter in the sense of "someone meaning to do or express something by forms"). Works of art are métonymie expressions of something (inherently valuable 19 ) characterizing their creators; but once these creators have obtained acknowledgement from a group of human Subjects, the artistic expressions themselves -and sometimes even trivial life details -can become Objects of intense perception, close to worship, in their own right; these expressions receive proper names (titles) and are experienced as singular, unique, and lovable. They are recognized and 'loved', as manifestations of great art -or at least as fetiches or relics, marked by an aura of sacredness. Human love, the lap (level 4) of consciousness unfolding we have to situate as superordinate in relation to the ethical lap (level 3), may well be of exactly this sort: a long-term feeling that flows from signs towards their author, the beloved person, but also backwards, from the person to its signs. The 'beauty' of the beloved is of the same semiotic kind as the 'beauty' of the work of art; so the vocabulary of art is the same as that of love. Beauty is the inversemetonymic energy flowing from the objectivated person toward its acts, gestures, properties, traces, communicated ideas, belongings, characteristics in general.
Art is historical for a reason having to do with the métonymie logic of the singular works. Since the appearances of a beloved person or work of art are appreciated as forms, they are of course iconicallv efficient: forms are copied into other forms that refer to the former (persons and works of art are imitated, admiration produces epigonism); but the copies will then banalize the original and neutralize its singularity, that is, its aesthetic core characteristic. Therefore, 18 If value is attributed to the referent, for example Picasso, of a set of metonvmic expressions, for example paintings, then other metonvmic expressions will tvpicallv inherit the value of the referent. The paintings will each be 'a Picasso'. 19 Artistic creation is of course giving, which may explain the basic value effect. Works of art have to be 'good', skilled, crafted, and the artist therefore has to be 'gifted'. singularity has to be restored by invention: history of art may be driven by this dynamics of singularity, de-singularization, and re-singularization. In the framework of aesthetics and desire, 01 is the valuable position, so agents of the category {02} will now want to occupy that position. The copier is an 02 trying to be the passional Ol of some passional Subject. The copier is an artistic agent who thus tries to 'steal' love from someone else, an established Ol. The copier is, as well as the original was, before him, an artist 20 -the psychology of artists often literally confirm this general determination, the presence of a disposition to paradoxically be 'more original than some original' in order to attract some preexisting 'love' (attention, interest, recognition, a certain aura of sacredness pertaining to 'belovedness'). The artistic form of consciousness thus has traits of 'evil', we might say. 21 The field of love as a mode of consciousness thus leads us from ethics to aesthetics, and from 'good' to intentionally 'bad' or 'evil' intentions and deeds. Art is, from this perspective, a form of aggressive, unethical behavior. 22
Levels of consciousness. Consciousness in language
A semiotics of consciousness naturally builds on the sign status of objects of conscious attention. The levels or aspects or dimensions of consciousness and selfhood we identify on phenomenological 23 grounds can be direcdy derived from the structural properties of the basic semiotic design of conscious scenarios. These aspects are thus not really of a 'higher order' of cognition but may instead be understood as aspects of certain intentional processes that are inherent in the basic design.
The Objectai syntax -Ol, 02, 03 in the space of the Subject -is actantial in the dynamic sense we have briefly explored. 24 In a Subject's perspective, Ol 20 This may sound confusing: the artist is here described as 'jealous' of an Object of desire, and so, imitating it to emulate and replace it. We know that art is based on mimesis; this is an extreme case. 21 Cf. Bataille (1957) , discussing relations between literature and evil, in particular with reference to Marquis de Sade and Baudelaire. 22 The standard view is the opposite: art is the didactics of ethics -but a cognitive aesthetics has to empirically look at the human beings involved, and the biographical results are not supportive of such a view. 23 Phenomenology as an empirical science or discipline is still difficult to distinguish from literary criticism and related 'subjectivistic' or introspective genres of knowledge production.
In the future, this may change, if pheno-cognition becomes a recognized area of research (cf.
Gallagher in press). 24 There may be many other Object categories in a Subject's basic conscious space, but the ones foregrounded here as dynamic and actantial appear to be doing elementary and indispensable is an attractor, 02 is an antagonist, 03 is an adjuvant: a lateral attractor, and these instances meet in one and the same space.
The Subject interacts with its Objects and Others and remembers itself as seen from their point of view -as cognized in their perspective, by their consciousness. This is of course a strong claim; I tend to defend this idea from a Peircean (abductive) stance: if we stipulate this to be true, then some given problems we wish to understand and develop become accessible to our understanding. We presuppose that Subjects interact in so far as they participate in each other's conscious scenarios. If these scenarios share the same format, intersubjective interaction does not have to be chaotic, even if it can be highly conflictive and driven by misunderstandings. Subjects may inherently 'know' that they are each others' actants. They can categorize each other as specified actants, and they can even, occasionally or regularly, agree to a shared status of Subjects, {S}, in a common story or project. 25 The first levels of consciousness follow from such intersubjective and actantial identifications: "if you are my 02 now, then I 'am' you in my immediate and perceptive imagination, so I can see myself as I still am as Subject, as if it were you ..." -This curious mental "... I am you ..." operation in the human mind has been amply commented in mental space and blending theory 26 , and there is little doubt that it plays a major role in human thinking and communication. Here, I am only adding two aspects: it is crucial to basic consciousness, and it is crucial to the function of memory in perception, imagination, and consciousness in general; it allows the Subject to remember other people's experiences and to 'mesh' them into perception. 27 However, in order to produce a minimal model of the stratified structure of elementary human consciousness, built on a primordial model of animal consciousness, as we have seen, we need to explore the possibility of identifying work for a semantics of thinking and feeling, so there are reasons to believe that they are indeed fundamental. 25 This view is in agreement with Gallagher and Hutto (in press), claiming that narrative attunement is a fundamental aspect of human intersubjectivitv. 26 Turner (1996) is a particularly significant early manifestation of this study of the counterfactual, conditional, highly complex but intuitively simple operation as an indispensable cognitive phenomenon. 27 So this would be mv modest addition to Glenberg's view of memorv in perception (Glenberg 1997 ).
a slightly more complex, fifth level or stratum: a linguistic region of consciousness. 28 The use of language presupposes the ethical, loving, aesthetic, and either generous or malignant attitude to forms in conscious content. Language tells stories that serve the urge to imitate, simulate, steal beauty or redirect love: slander, gossip 29 , is apparently a grounding function of language use in all cultures; but these stories can also serve the 'law', the restoration of truth, the project of justice, the maintenance of respect, etc. -all against the (presupposed) malignant tendency. Language creates opposing semantic representations of versions of states of affairs; it does not direcdy represent a Subject's monistic perspective. It is inscribed in a dialogical 'discourse', a diatribe, an unending polemic debate between versions and evaluations of 'what happens' that constantly imply differing and conflicting actantial voices. Linguistic enundatiorP®, the structure of persons, voices, viewpoints, modes, emotional speech, temperatures, etc. in the grammatical organization of human language in sentences as utterances, is a result of this underlying linguistic polyphony, not only in its use but in the core of its constructionality. 31 The most striking fact of enunciation is probably the 'Olympic' phenomenon: the fact that we can talk 'objectively' and state what is the case about a state of affairs without having to specify our own actantial involvement as interactively cognizing speakers. 32 We most often use this neutral mode of what I would like to call linguistic consciousness: "the truth is that ..." It is a totally disembodied mode of stating positive or negative facts; from nobody's point of view in particular something just is the case, 'objectively'. Here the primordial, objective surround space itself apparently acquires a voice and speaks, in some languages using the core copula verb (Latin: ESSE) meaning to be. i} Language is apparently coextensive with the very space of presence. It can therefore speak, describe, predicate, evaluate, without having to signify or specify a speaker. Or rather, the impersonal thought of the space in which contents (states, events, acts) take place becomes language that affirms its 'objective' content -and the actual speaker appears as an appendix that gives voice to this 'spatial truth', the unembodied truth of 'what is'.
We may ask how it is possible that language can express the existence, state, and essence of things without referring to a subjective anchoring of such expressions. In other words, how did humans happen to develop such an impersonal form of consciousness -paradoxically, the expression of an disembodied consciousness, to be experienced through language as a 'voice of truth? As the voice of things themselves...
The answer, I think, lies in an experience of shared time. What time is it? (ESSE again). It is this or that time for all subjects co-present. Time fills the social space of presence as a shared atmosphere. In human evolution, time eventually acquires this generic status in so far as it is symbolized in a musical and/or calendaric metric, based on numerical and personalized names of beats, units, and slots in time. 34 The shared now is a metrically determined moment in an either musical or chronological sense. It is highly probable that music and chronology were directly and constitutionally interconnected in the mindset of our early ancestors. Time was sung and played; watchmen's hour songs still give us an idea of the 'music of nights and days' as an early temporal symbolization, whose micro-format is music, and whose macro-format would be the calendaric expansions of the concept of universal time slots into named entities such as hours, days, weeks, months, years, cycles etc. Truth and time still coincide in sentence grammar: many epistemic adverbs or adverbials are universally used to specify both (always, sometimes, never; seldom, often; once, twice; one fine day, ad calendas grecas...).
The mode of consciousness that allows us to speak 'olympically', and thus to describe, judge, evaluate things, states, events, acts, from nobody's point of view, is a creation of language, or is inherent in the cognitive mode that creates 33 Even if the first utterances of infants are quite 'egocentric', they clearly can do the trick: "Juice -gone" (meaning "give me more"). 34 The symbolization of time in terms of cyclically appearing periods -by calendars -is in fact a cognitive feat that can hardly be overestimated as a culturally constitutive factor. The origin of mathematics is to be found in the counting of temporal units.
language. This mode can of course be personalized emphatically, but simple sentences are most often still as neutral as they are simple: "It is raining". The linguistic creation has to be performed, and in such a way as to show that the 'sayer' is not the speaker (in the sense of the subjective source of an expressed stance); it has to be embodied 'impersonally', through shared rhythmic symbolization, possibly music and (ritual) dance. Otherwise "It is raining" could not mean "It rains now (here)", instead of -"I see rain". We still use ritualized prosody in the performance of administrative prose.
This ultimate mode or level of consciousness, allowing us to communicate thoughts without an author, impersonal statements, has had explosive impact on the communal life of our species. It has allowed us to develop technologies, deontologies, historiographies, philosophies, and, lately, sciences. Religions can be seen as attempts to re-personalize the impersonal ("It is raining" -> "Tlaloc 35 rains").
A vertical architecture of forms of consciousness and corresponding versions of selves and others, as presented here, would look like the following graph, representing five distinct stages and five semiotic instances that may have made possible the transitions from a lower to a higher stage ( fig. 4): (5) linguistic consciousness (self: "I", "you", "we"... versus "it") musical cognition (4) aesthetic consciousness (self: Name, metonymy) underlying, heavier modes (of embodied consciousness). So we could, and did, invent (4) an art based on language (poetry, literature); we develop (3) normarive discourses·, we (2) tell stories, anecdotes, create myths; and (1) we simply chat and twitter about even-day events and situations. We could easily, and did, get the idea that all this is instead due to language, and that therefore language and consciousness are coextensive, or even somehow identical. We then need to remember that it still cannot rain on level (1).
Concluding remarks
Consciousness is presentation 36 -through the semiotic 'windows' in the direcdy perceived present scenario -of states of affairs existing mainly outside of this scenario; the space of presence is just the limited 'office' of consciousness, where things that happen deliver laconic 'reports'. These things and states of affairs are thus construed contents that consciousness has to represent during the presentation of their 'representatives'. Representation functions as the background of presentation. Representation -the off-line mode of consciousness, so to speak, backing up its on-line mode -is, as we have seen, based on intersubjectivity, which is itself a complex cascade of interactions that leads to shared meaning stabilized culturally through symbolization and particularly, through language. Thinking may be the very process that articulates, interrelates, what is presented and what is represented, in consciousness. What is presentedDescartes' res extensa, and what is represented, that is, given by consciousness as res cogitans, as taking place on the stage of the 'theater of the mind' -a problematic metaphor that still may be useful 37 -are semioticallv connected as two sides of the same reality. This reality is of course cognized in terms of an 'external world', which has a sensibilis and an intelligibilis aspect. We do not cognize represented states of affairs as internal to our mind: consciousness does not represent itself, so conscious contents have to be experienced as linked to the real, to be 'really' relevant at least in some domain of reality. 
